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Will the Rotterdam Rules be Accepted?
A Liner Cargo Interest Perspective

The paper begins with some background on modern liner shipping and cargo
interest perspectives before considering the Rotterdam Rules 2008 (The
Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly
by Sea), which could ultimately replace Canada's existing carriage of goods
legislation. The authors explore the key issues arising from the implementation
of the Rules, and discuss why, from a manufactured goods perspective, there
will likely be limited acceptance by cargo owners. They conclude that the gains
made in the areas of electronic documentation and greater clarity on delay, as
well as altered limits of liability do not offset the fact that most manufactured
goods now move under confidential service contracts that may or may not choose
to incorporate the Rotterdam Rules. On balance, it is unlikely that there will be
widespread acceptance of the rules by those purchasing liner shipping services.
L'article explique d'abord bri~vement les int6r~ts et les perspectives du transport
des marchandises par navire avant d'examiner la Convention des Nations Unies
sur le contrat de transport international de marchandises effectuA entibrement ou
partiellement par mer (les R&gles de Rotterdam 2008), quipourrait ventuellement
remplacer les lois du Canada sur le transport de marchandises. Les auteurs se
penchent sur les principaux enjeux de la mise en ceuvre des R~gles et expliquent
pourquoi, en ce quia traitaux biens fabriquds, il estprobable qu'elles ne bdndficient
que d'une acceptation limitde par les propridtaires des cargaisons. 1/s concluent
que les gains rdalisds aux chapitres de la documentation 6lectronique et de la
plus grande clart6 quant aux retards, tout comme les limites de responsabilitd
modifibes, ne compenseront pas le fait que la plupart des biens fabriqu6s sont
aujourd'hui transport6s en vertu de contrats de services confidentiels quipourront
incorporer ou non les R&gles de Rotterdam. Tout compte fait, I'acceptation
g6ndralisde des Rdgles sera peu probable pour les acheteurs de services de
transport par navire.
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Introduction
Mattel's 'all-American' Barbie, to use one of Levinson's insightful
illustrations, was anything but all-American; her plastic body, clothes and
hair all came from various factories in Japan, Taiwan and China.' Barbie
was conceived in 1959 and this inexpensive item, relatively speaking,
could withstand the cost of transport, be made half-way around the globe
and still be affordable for a generation of female baby boomers.2
It is now more than 50 years since Barbie (and her creator Mattel)
demonstrated the power of global supply chains to transform international
trade. Mattel took a value chain approach, later popularized by Michael
Porter,3 and realized the wealth creation possible from outsourcing
production, although not design or marketing, that eventually was the
beginning of a wave of globalization and a symbol of commerce in the
latter part of the 20th century. Until ten years ago, the inter-organizational
cooperation underpinning such a value chain approach was founded on
the concept of maintaining domestic design, marketing and financing of
trading activities while outsourcing production, assembly and distribution
to lower cost countries, so that the wealthy might become wealthier in a
global world. Even that world has changed. As Thomas Friedman noted
recently, "every product and many services now are imagined, designed,
marketed and built through global supply chains that seek to access the

I. Marc Levinson, The Box: How The Shipping ContainerMade the World Smaller and the World
Economy Bigger (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2006).
2.
Mary R Brooks, "International Trade in Manufactured Goods" in Costas Th Grammenos, ed,
The Handbook ofMaritime Economics andBusiness, 2d ed (London: Inforna Publishing, 2010) 99 at
100-101 [Brooks, "Manufactured Goods"].
3. Michael E Porter, Competitive Advantage: Creatingand SustainingSuperiorPerformance(New
York: Free Press, 1985).
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best quality talent at the lowest cost, wherever it exists." 4 Today, even
design and financing may be crowd-sourced' on the Internet.
The legal regimes governing liabilities in international trade and
transport have not kept pace with the changing reality of global commerce,
although they have seen many variations since the 1924 Hague Rules 6
governing bills of lading in the carriage of goods by sea were developed
(see below). In early 2008, the United Nations Commission on International
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) completed its work on the latest iteration, The
Convention on Contractsfor the InternationalCarriageof Goods Wholly
or Partly by Sea (Rotterdam Rules)'; and the 2008 Rotterdam Rules are
not likely the last. This article examines the Rotterdam Rules and what
they bring to the world of trade and transport from the perspective of
those who own the cargo at the moment the rules apply; the authors adopt
the perspective of a user of multimodal transport' in examining what the
Rotterdam Rules offer cargo owners over what is already in use today.
Since its inception in 1956, containerization for the transport of goods
by sea has grown exponentially. From 1990 to 2010, container trade was
the fastest-growing cargo segment at an average annual rate of 8.2%.9
After a recessionary retrenchment in 2009, global container trade volumes
rebounded 12.9% in 2010, accounting for 140 million TEUs (20-foot
equivalent units), more than 1.3 billion tons, and almost six times its 1990
volume."o Today, container transport for door-to-door moves has become
the main form of transport for manufactured goods and component parts
(although air cargo plays an ever-increasing role). This development was
certainly not foreseen by those who drafted the rules governing contracts
of carriage in the 1920s and later. Moreover, the conflict between carriage
liability regimes for maritime transport and the need for multimodal
regimes for container trades has needed reconciliation, and failed to find it.
4.
Thomas L Friedman, "Made in the World," New York Times (28 January 2012), online: New York
Times <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/29/opinion/sunday/friedman-made-in-the-world.html>.
5.
Crowd-sourcing is outsourcing the desired service by posting requirements on the Internet
and seeking Expressions of Interest from undefined suppliers who may be located anywhere on the
globe. Supply of the desired services may be for free or at a cost of less than found in a traditional
marketplace, as it enables participants to collaborate creatively using the "wisdom of the crowd."
6.
International Convention for the Unificaton of certain Rules relating to Bills of Lading, 25
August 1924, 120 UNTS 155 (entered into force 2 June 1931) [Hague Rules].
7.
11 December 2008, 63 UNTS 122.
8.
Multimodal transport is used to indicate transportation that includes more than one mode of
transport between origin and destination. A common example would be the transport from a seller's
factory in Germany to the Port of Antwerp by truck, loaded onto a ship bound for New York and then
delivered by train to Cleveland Ohio. Most multimodal transport uses containers.
9.
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Secretariat, Review of Maritime
Transport(New York: United Nations, 2011) at 21.
10. Ibidat2l-22.
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In 1982, when containerized transport was becoming widely adopted
and no longer considered a specialty service, Dalhousie University was
fortunate to have been contracted by the Government of Canada to
undertake an assessment of the The Water CarriageofGoods Act, 1936" in
the context of the other conventions available for Canadian signature and
ratification. The existing unimodal regimes were the Hague Rules, 2 the
Hague/Visby Rules," and the additional Protocol concluded at Brussels,14
and the Hamburg Rules." The 1936 Act implemented the Hague Rules.
As it had been only two short years since the development of
the UN Convention on International Multimodal Transport of Goods
198016 (Multimodal Convention), and the Hamburg Rules were under
consideration by the Government of Canada for adoption, the task the
Dalhousie team addressed was to determine the best course of action for
Canada in its choice of a future regime: adopting the Hamburg Rules,
adopting the HagueNisby Rules or retaining the current Hague Rules.
The six-member Dalhousie Ocean Studies Programme team was most
ably led by Hugh Kindred. It concluded that "The Hamburg Rules offer
major commercial advantages over the Hague Rules for the Canadian
consignee and the Canadian owner of containerizable cargo."" That
research work still informs Canadian government thinking, according to
the latest report by the International Marine Policy branch of Transport
Canada." In the interim, in 1993 the Government of Canada updated its
marine legislation and adopted the Hague/Visby Rules in the 1993 Carriage
of Goods by Water Act,'9 which was ultimately incorporated into section
43 of the 2001 Marine LiabilityAct.20 In addition, the Marine LiabilityAct
included a transition plan to move to the Hamburg Rules should they gain

11.

SC 1936, c 49.
12. Hague Rules, supra note 4.
13. Protocol to amend the International Convention for the unification of certain rules of law
relating to bills of lading, 23 February 1968, 1412 UNTS 128.
14. Protocol amending the International Convention for the unication of certain rules of law
relating to bills of lading, 25 August 1925, as amended by the Protocol of 23 February 1968, 21
December 1979, 1412 UNTS 146.
15. United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, 1978, 31 March 1978, 1695 UNTS
3 (entered into force I November 1992).
16. United Nations Convention on International Multimodal Transport of Goods, with annex, 24
May 1980, 19 ILM 938.
17. Hugh M Kindred, et al, The Future of Canadian Carriage of Goods by Water Law (Halifax:
Dalhousie Ocean Studies Programme, 1982) at 294.
18. Transport Canada, "Report to Parliament. Marine Liability Act, Part 5: Liability For the
Carriage of Goods by Water (TP 14947E)" (2010), online: <http://www.tc.gc.caleng/policy/reportacf-hamburg-menu-1099.htm> [Transport Canada, "Marine Liability Act"].
19. Carriage of Goods by Water Act 1993, SC 1993, c 21.
20. Marine Liability Act, SC 2001, c 6.
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the support needed for adoption by the global trading community. In the
interim, several studies examined the impact of unimodal and multimodal
conventions, as well as model contract terms available through the
International Chamber of Commerce for trading and shipping interests.
For example, Kindred and Brooks looked at the incidence and effects of
delay on cargo owners in order to better appreciate its impacts on potential
claimants.2' A 1994 study of the multimodal rules developed the thinking
further, and led to a book on the topic that remains a key reference work
on the impact of multimodal carriage rules on the various parties using
more than one mode for the transport of goods.2 2 With the adoption of
the Rotterdam Rules in 2008, the current question has become whether
Canada should adopt them.
Over the 30 years since the 1982 investigation, no consensus has
been reached on what the best mechanism is for managing the critical
issues of dealing with the liability for loss, damage or delay of goods in
the relationship between shippers and carriers in a single mode, let alone
for a multimodal transport supply chain. Today, goods in the process of
being manufactured may be conceived and designed anywhere, have
their component parts come from multiple countries, be assembled in
yet another or others, cross a border six to eight times during production,
and use multiple transport modes in the process of being delivered to the
nearest retail outlet for purchase by a consumer. It is extremely important
to the economic interests of all trading nations that this complicated supply
chain functions seamlessly and equitably for all involved. To achieve such
a goal, there must be not only political will to sign and ratify improvements
on existing carriage rules, but also widespread adoption of the contract
terms without exemptions being negotiated at the firm contract negotiation
level. It has taken eight years to negotiate the Rotterdam Rules, and it has
been extremely difficult to reconcile carrier and cargo interests.
Given that Kindred et al recommended that trading interests be granted
a priority over carrier interests,23 this article examines the Rotterdam Rules
in the context of that work and subsequent work by Kindred and Brooks.24
It begins by noting the current status of the adoption by governments of

21. Hugh M Kindred & Mary R Brooks, "The Incidence and Effect of Marine Cargo Delays in Law
and Commerce" (1990) 17:3 Maritime Policy and Management 189.
22. Hugh M Kindred & Mary R Brooks, "New and Improved? The UNCTAD/ICC Multimodal
Rules Reviewed" (1994) 33:3 Transportation Journal 5 [Kindred & Brooks, "New and Improved"];
and Hugh M Kindred & Mary R Brooks, Multimodal Transport Rules (The Hague: Kluwer Law
International, 1997) [Kindred & Brooks, Multimodal Rules].
23. Kindred et al, supra note 17.
24. Kindred & Brooks, "New and Improved," supra note 22.
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the Rotterdam Rules as a replacement for earlier marine liability regimes.
The next section addresses the coverage provided by the Rotterdam Rules
in the context of the multimodal rules explored by Kindred and Brooks 25;
that is, the authors look at the basis of liability covered by the Rotterdam
Rules when compared with other multimodal options before focusing
on the limits of liability in a particular case of loss. To explore these
circumstances, this article returns to one case used by Kindred and Brooks
to explain how limitations on liability under the exclusively marine legal
regimes and the Multimodal Convention, compare with the Rotterdam
Rules. As the focus of this article is primarily on how the Rotterdam
Rules will be seen by supply chain managers in the manufactured goods
and parts transport sector, the penultimate section identifies the key
"improvements" introduced by the rules from the perspective of liner
shipping cargo interests that include their applicability to volume contracts
and e-documentation. The article then concludes with a summation as to
what considerations will play a role in adoption of the Rotterdam Rules by
those cargo owners with influence on the choice of rules they negotiate.
I. Current thinking of governments on the Rotterdam Rules
In early 2008, UNCITRAL completed its work on the Rotterdam Rules,
and they were adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in
December 2008; as of January 2012, there were 24 signatories with Spain
being the first and only country to ratify the convention (Appendix 1).
The convention will not come into force until a year after 20 countries
have ratified it. The Rules set out the basis and extent of liability for cargo
damage occurring in transit so that beneficial cargo owners and marine
carriers may contract for the carriage of goods with confidence.or with
insurance cover arranged-or both.
Due to the diverse views of stakeholders, the Canadian government
remains a non-signatory to the Rotterdam Rules. In 2010, the International
Marine Policy branch of Transport Canada reported on its review of the
existing Hague/Visby regime under the 2001 Marine Liability Act26 and
reported on its assessment of the Hamburg and Rotterdam Rules and
whether they should be adopted by Canada. This was not its first review
of the Hague/Visby Rules, as the branch had completed one before under
section 44 of the Marine Liability Act, 2001, which recommends fiveyear reviews to consider adoption of the Hamburg Rules. International
Marine Policy noted there were various sticking points with the Rotterdam

25.
26.

Kindred & Brooks, Multimodal Rules, supranote 22.
Transport Canada, "Marine Liability Act," supra note 18.
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Rules, provisions related to domestic carriage of goods by water being
specifically highlighted.2 7 It is the opinion of Transport Canada that the
Hague/Visby Rules, as implemented in the Marine Liability Act, continue
to meet Canada's needs and reflect that it is in Canada's best interests to
align its water transport rules with those of major trading partners. 28 As the
Hamburg Rules have not been well received by Canada's trading partners
(Table 1), or even the global trading community at large (Table 2), and the
Rotterdam Rules are not yet widely signed (let alone ratified), Transport
Canada recommended that the situation be reviewed as mandated in
the Marine Liability Act again in five years, with a report due 1 January
2015. Most important for understanding Canada's pro-trade position on
the rules, the 2010 report identifies Canada's major waterborne trading
partners and their current legal liability regimes, presented in Table 1 in a
slightly different format than the original report.

27. Transport Canada, "Notice to Industry" (15 September 2009), online: McGill <https://secureweb.
mcgill.ca/maritimelaw/sites/mcgill.ca.maritimelaw/files/Noticejto industryRotterdamRules.pdf >.
28. Transport Canada, "Marine Liability Act," supra note 18.
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Table 1: Canada's Trading Partners by Value and Regimes They Have Adopted
Hague/Visby Rules
% of CDN
Waterbome
Countries
Trade
Australia
1.06%
Belgium
1.63%
Denmark
0.67%
Ecuador
0.11%

Hague Rules
%of CDN
Waterborne
Countries
Trade
Algeria
3.10%
Argentina
0.17%
Cuba
0.81%
Iran
0.30%

Hamburg Rules
% of CDN
Waterborne
Countries
Trade
Austria
0.55%
Barbados
0.02%
Cameroon
0.01%
Chile
0.77%

Finland

0.67%

Israel

0.28%

Czech Republic

0.13%

Ireland

0.21%

Jamaica

0.21%

Dominican

0.10%

France

2.03%

Malaysia

0.67%

Egypt

0.31%

Germany

4.62%

aland

0.21%

Guinea

0.04%

Greece
Japan
Italy
South Korea

0.09%
9.51%
2.13%
2.19%

Peru
Portugal
Turkey
U.S.A.

0.50%
0.23%
0.79%
17.51%

Hungary
Kenya
Lebanon
Morocco

0.11%
0.03%
0.04%
0.16%

Latvia

0.03%

Nigeria

0.45%

Luxembourg

0.07%

Romania

0.13%

Mexico

0.84%

Senegal

0.01%

Netherlands

2.09%

Syria

0.05%

Norway

3.71%

Tanzania

0.02%

Poland

0.30%

Tunisia

0.05%

Singapore

0.31%

Sub-total

2.98%

Slovakia

0.09%

Spain

0.84%

Other Regimes*

19.16%

Sri Lanka

0.22%

Brazil

1.60%

Sweden

0.62%

China

15.11%

Switzerland

0.34%

India

1.24%

.

Repub.

1.21%
Russia
3.66%
Knged m
22.14%
24.78%
Total
38.04%
Total
Total
Note:
*Other category is states that have developed their own particular maritime code and have
not ratified any convention on carriage of goods.
Source: Transport Canada "Marine Liability Act," supra note 18.
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Table 2: Adoption of the Hamburg Rules
State

Signature

Albania
Austria

30/04/1979

Ratification,
Accession(*)

Entry into
Force

20/07/2006(*)

01/08/2007

29/07/1993

01/08/1994

Barbados

02/02/1981(*)

01/11/1992

Botswana

16/02/1988(*)

01/11/1992

Burkina Faso

14/08/1989(*)

01/11/1992

Burundi

04/09/1998(*)

01/10/1999

Cameroon

21/10/1993(*)

01/11/1994

Brazil

31/03/1978

Chile

31/03/1978

09/07/1982

01/11/1992

Czech Republic (a,b)

02/06/1993

23/06/1995

01/07/1996

Democratic Republic of the

19/04/1979

28/09/2007(*)

01/10/2008

23/04/1979

01/11/1992

07/02/1996(*)

01/03/1997

21/03/1996(*)

01/04/1997

23/01/1991(*)

01/11/1992

Congo

Denmark

18/04/1979

Dominican Republic
Ecuador

31/03/1978

Egypt

31/03/1978

Finland

18/04/1979

France

18/04/1979

Gambia
Georgia

Germany
Ghana

31/03/1978
31/03/1978

Guinea

Holy See

31/03/1978

Hungary

23/04/1979

05/07/1984

01/11/1992

10/05/2001(*)

01/06/2002

Kazakhstan

18/06/2008(*)

01/07/2009

Kenya

31/07/1989(*)

01/11/1992

Lebanon

04/04/1983(*)

01/11/1992

Lesotho

26/10/1989(*)

01/11/1992

Liberia

16/09/2005(*)

01/10/2006

18/03/1991(*)

01/11/1992

12/06/1981(*)

01/11/192

Jordan

Madagascar

31/03/1978

Malawi

Mexico
Morocco

31/03/1978
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Signature

State

Ratification,

Entry into

Accession(*)

Force

07/11/1988(*)

01/11/1992

19/07/2005(*)

01/08/2006

Romania

07/01/1982(*)

01/11/1992

Saint Vincent and the
Grenadines

12/09/2000(*)

01/10/2001

Nigeria
Norway

18/04/1979

Pakistan

08/03/1979

Panama

31/03/1978

Paraguay
Philippines

15/06/1978

Portugal

31/03/1978

Senegal

31/03/1798

17/03/1986

01/11/1992

Sierra Leone

15/08/1978

07/10/1988

01/11/1992

Singapore

31/03/1978

Slovakia (a)

28/05/1993

Sweden

18/04/1979

Syrian Arab Republic

16/10/2002(*)

01/11/2003

Tunisia

15/09/1989(*)

01/11/1992

Uganda

06/07/1979(*)

01/11/1992

United Republic of Tanzania

24/07/1979(*)

01/11/1992

07/10/1991(*)

01/11/1992

Venezuela (Bolivarian

31/03/1978

Republic of)

Zambia

Notes:

All dates: DD/MM/YYYY Total Parties: 34

(a)

The Convention was signed by the former Czechoslovakia on 6 March 1979. On 28 May
1993, Slovakia and on 2 June 1993, the Czech Republic deposited its instruments of succession to the signature and the Czech Republic subsequently deposited its instrument of ratification on 23 June 1995. The Czech Republic, upon ratification, withdrew the delar-ation,
referred to in footnote (b), that which had been made by the former Czechoslovakia, and
lodged the declaration referred to in.the second paragraph of that footnote.

(b)

Upon signature, the former Czechoslovakia declared in accordance with article 26 the formula for converting the amounts of liability referred to in paragraph 2 of that article into the
Czechoslovak currency and the amount of the limits of liability to be applied in the
territory of Czechoslovakia as expressed in the Czechoslovak currency. The Czech Republic declared that limits of carrier's liability in the territory of the Czech republic adhered to
the provision of article 6 of the Convention.

Source: United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, "Status. 1978 United Nations
Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea-the 'Hamburg Rules,"' online: UNCITRAL <http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral texts/transportgoods/
Hamburg status.html> (as of 22 March 2012).
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Outside Canada, the U.S. has been a vocal supporter of the convention
and was an original signatory. The U.S. does have a better reason to be in
support of the convention than many other countries. Unlike Canada, the
U.S.'s current maritime transportation laws were adopted in 1936, based
on the 1924 Hague Rules. Thus, though the Rotterdam Rules may not
improve on the more modem maritime transportation laws in place in some
countries, they are a clear improvement over current U.S. laws. 29 Signature,
however, is not sufficient; the U.S. has yet to ratify the convention. 0
The EU situation is somewhat more complex due to its supranational
form of governance. The U.K. is still neutral on whether to adopt the
convention, and the government is still assessing the potential impact of
the rules in consultation with stakeholders. Its policy is to be based on not
favouring one stakeholder group over another, but seeking to adopt new
rules that are "broadly acceptable to all commercial parties,"" taking into
account the U.K.'s interests in maintaining the country's strong position in
maritime dispute resolution. Germany has not come out in support of the
new rules yet and, in fact, has drafted legislation for consideration that would
deviate from the Rotterdam Rules.3 2 The European Commission initially
came out against the new convention, thinking it might recommend an
alternative legal regime for EU members33; many other European nations
are likely to ratify, but are waiting on U.S. ratification before they do so.34
The EU would like to support, for environmental policy reasons, the
development of short sea shipping through programs like the Motorways

29. William Tetley, "Transports de cargaison par mer, les R6gles de Rotterdam, leur adoption par
les Etats-Unis, le Canada, I'Union Europ~enne et les pays transporteurs du monde?" (Conference
Proceedings of the Resonsibility, Fraternity, and Sustainability in Law, A Symposium in honour of
Charles D Gouthier delivered at the Faculty of Law, McGill University, 20-21 May 2011), online:
Center for International Sustainable Development Law<http://cisdl.org/gonthier/public/pdfs/papers/
Conf/oC3%A9rence%20Charles%2OD%20Gonthier/ 20-%2OWilliam%20Tetley.pdf>.
30. RG Edmonson, "Rotterdam Rules, Still Alive," The Journal of Commerce (24 October 2011),
online:
JOC
<http://wwwjoc.com/economy-watch/world-economy-news/rotterdam-rules-stillalive_20111024.html> [copy on file with author].
31. SITPRO, "The Rotterdam Rules: A Guide" (2010), online: National Archives UK <http://
webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20100918113753/http://www.sitpro.org.uk//reports/
rotterdamrulesguide.pdf>.
32. International Chamber of Shipping, "Draft German Maritime Law Reform Act: industry Letter"
(27 September 2011), online: Korea Shipowners' Association <http://www.shipowners.or.kr/bbs/
board.php?bo-table=s36&wrid=559>.
33. RG Edmonson, "European Commission Weighs in Against Rotterdam Rules," The Journal of
Commerce (24 June 2009), online: JOC <http://www.joc.com/economy-watch/european-commissionweighs-against-rotterdam-rules_20090624.html>.
34. RG Edmonson,"Spain Ratifies Rotterdam Rules," The Journal of Commerce (27 January 2011),
online: JOC <http://www.joc.com/regulation-policy/spain-ratifies-rotterdam-rules_20110127.html>.
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of the Sea," thereby encouraging a modal shift from land-based transport
to shipping. However, it must also be concerned about how the Rotterdam
Rules will conflict with or otherwise impact these efforts. EftestolWilhelmsson has looked at the Rotterdam Rules and noted the European
need for a new legal regime that clarifies liabilities stemming from
multimodal transportation options in order to promote adoption of short
sea shipping.36 Multimodal options fit with the European Commission's
promotion of sustainable transportation options, as they are seen as more
environmentally friendly. She sees the Rotterdam Rules, though imperfect
with regards to providing an ideal liability regime for multimodal
transport, as a more workable solution for multimodal transport than the
current network liability system in place. Additionally, if the Rotterdam
Rules do end up finding international acceptance, she concludes that the
convention's modified network liability system would make the most
sense in the European context.
Outside of Western nations, India remains neutral and undecided as to
whether to adopt the convention and China has not signed it. Issues raised
in China include the increased liability exposure, the overall benefits to
China's sea trade and the perception that some provisions are too academic.3
Furthermore, China has concerns about electronic documents,38 which will
be addressed in a later section of this paper. In the Arab world, government
and industry got together to make recommendations to the Arab League.
In their Alexandria Declaration,it was recommended that all fifteen Arab
League countries should jointly sign the Rotterdam Rules. 9 Many Arab
countries are not parties to international conventions dealing with maritime
transportation, and the Rotterdam Rules would move Arab country laws in

35. Mary R Brooks & James D Frost, "Short Sea Developments in Europe: Lessons For Canada"
(Paper delivered at the Canadian Transportation Research Forum Annual Conference, Victoria, 2427 May 2009), online: Canadian Transportation Research Forum <www.ctrf.calconferences/2009
Victoria/Conference Proceedings/18 Brooks Frost 2009.pdf>.
36. Ellen Eftest6l-Wilhelmsson, "The Rotterdam Rules in a European Multimodal Context" (2010)
16 Journal of International Maritime Law 274.
37. "India undecided on adopting Rotterdam Rules Convention" (23 February 2010), online: High
Beam Research <http://www.highbeam.com/doc/l P3-2273837851 .html> [copy on file with author];
and Wenhao Han, "China Reluctant to Sign the Rotterdam Rules" (14 April 2010), online: Mondaq
<http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=98072&login--true&nogo=l>.
38.
Felix WH Chan, "In Search of a Global Theory of Maritime Electronic Commerce: China's
Position on the Rotterdam Rules" (2009) 40:2 J Mar L & Comm 185.
39. Arab Academy for Science, Technology & Maritime Transportation, Press Release, "Alexandria
Declaration 2010" (3 February 2010), online: UNCITRAL <http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/
news/ArabPressReleaseRR.pdf>.
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this area to be more modem and uniform. 4 0 The Montevideo Declaration
presented to Latin American countries, on the other hand, recommended
that the declaration not be adopted, seeing it as potentially harmful to
Latin American trade. This declaration raised issues about the convention
such as its complexity, the fact that it does not involve carriage without a
sea leg, and the removal and alteration of various legal terms. 4' The lack of
consensus is likely a pre-cursor to yet another failed set of rules.
II. A comparison of the rules: Rotterdam Rules versus multimodal rules
Because the existing liability regimes for the carriage of cargo were not
particularly satisfactory for the carriage of containerized cargo, which
might use more than one mode or might have hidden unattributable damage,
the international trading community established, over the years, three sets
of multimodal rules. The first, designed by the International Chamber of
Commerce (ICC), were issued in 1975, and filled an important legal gap
for trading interests 42 (ICC Rules 1975). These were not mandatory legal
arrangements but model contract terms that would establish the rules for
liability allocation in cases of loss or damage in a multimodal transport
shipment. As many cargo owners and developing country governments
were unenthusiastic about these industry-initiated rules,4 3 they persuaded
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) to
write a new convention, the Multimodal Convention. This convention also
failed to gain traction with the trading community and so a third attempt
was made jointly by the ICC and UNCTAD resulting in the 1992 Rules
for Multimodal Transport Documents" (hereinafter referred to as the
UNCTAD/ICC Rules). While the application of the Rotterdam Rules is
broader than for just multimodal transport, it is important to understand
that the Rules recognize, for the first time, that liner (scheduled) shipping
services are very different in terms of needs than tramp shipping, and the
Rules do distinguish between the two in its definitions. For the purposes

40. Ibrahim M Nader, "The 2008 Rotterdam Rules: An Arab World Perspective" (2010), online:
Rotterdam
Rules <http://www.rotterdamrules.com/sites/default/files/pdf/%7BBOF7EFI0-6D9F4712-9AI7-F3 IAl2A487AE%7D The%202008%20Rotterdam%20Rules%2OAn%20Arab%20
World%20Perspective.pdf:>.
41. Jos6 Alcdntara et al, "Declaration of Montevideo" (10 October 2010), online:
Rotterdam
Rules
<http://www.rotterdamrules.com/sites/default/files/pdf/DECLARATION%20
OF%20MONTEVIDEO%20FRINAL.pdf>.
42. ICC Rules 1975, International Chamber of Commerce, Uniform rulesfor a combined transport
document, ICC PublicationNo 298 (Paris: ICC, 1975).
43. Kindred & Brooks, Multimodal Rules, supra note 22.
44. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development & International Chamber of Commerce,
Rules for Multimodal Transport Documents, ICC PublicationNo 481 (Paris: ICC, 1992), online:
UNCTAD <r0.unctad.org/tH/docs-legal/nm-rules/UNCTAD-ICC%20Rules.pdf>.
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of this paper, we focus only on those differences relevant to liner shipping
operations when assessing the likely adoption of these rules in comparison
with other options.
Table 3: Basis of Multimodal Operator Liability for Damage and/or Delay
ICC Rules 1975
Lost or Damaged Goods
Rule 5(b), (c) &
(e)-Carrier assumes
liability also for
employees, agents and
sub-contractors, subject
to particular rules for
unattributed damage and
delayed goods, below.
Delayed Goods
Rules 5(b), (c), (f) and
14-Carrier liable only
for localized delay,
according to compulsory
modal rules or national
law.

Multimodal
Convention 1980

UNCTAD/ICC
Rules 1992

Rotterdam Rules
2009

Art. I5-Carrier
assumes liability
also for employees,
agents and
subcontractors,

Rule 4.2-Carrier
assumes liability
also for employees,
agents and
subcontractors,

Art. 18-Carrier
assumes liability
also for employees,
agents and
subcontractors.

Art. 16-Above
principle for
unattributed damage
also applies to delay.

Rule 5.1-Carrier
liable for delay on
above principle for
unattributed damage
but only when
shipper demanded
timely delivery

Art. 17.1-Above
principle for
unattributed damage
also applies to
delay.
Art. 21-Defines
delay as failure to
deliver goods within
agreed timeframe.
Art. 23-lClaim of
loss due to delay
must be sent to
carrier within 21

Unattributed Damage
Rule 12--Carrier
presumed at fault unless
it proves:
(i) fault of shipper
(ii) defective packing or
marks
(iii) inherent vice of
goods
(iv) unavoidable work
stoppage
(v) nuclear accident
(vi) any other cause
beyond its 'reasonable
diligence' to prevent or
avoid.

principlefor

lin

days from delivery.

Art. 16-Carrier
presumed at fault
unless it proves it
and its employees,
agents and
subcontractors 'took
all measures that
could reasonably be
required' to avoid
loss.

Rule 5. 1--Carrier
presumed at fault
unless it proves "no
fault or neglect"
by itself, its
employees, agents or
subcontractors,

Art. 17.1--Carrier
liable if claimant
proves that the loss,
or basis for the loss,
occurred during the
period of the carrier'
responsibility.
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Attributed Damage
Rule 13-Carrier liable
according to compulsory
or incorporated modal
rules or national law
about basis of liability.

Note:
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Multimodal

UNCTAD/ICC

Rotterdam Rules

Convention 1980

Rules 1992

2009

No special rule about
basis of liability.
Above principle of
unattributed damage
also applies to
attributed damage.

No special rule
about basis of
liablity, except:
Rule 5.4-Carrier is
additionally excused
on sea or waterways
leg if loss caused by:
(i) error in navigation
or management of
the ship, or (ii) fire,
unless due to fault
and privity of carrier,
provided carrier
proves due diligence
was exercised to
make ship seaworthy.

No special rule about
basis of liability,
except:
Art. 17.3-Carrier
excused, if fault is
proven, if loss caused
by: (i) Act of God,
(ii) accidents at sea,
(iii) war, terrorism,
etc. (iv) imposed
detention or seizure
not attributable to
the carrier, (v) labour
stoppage, (vi) ship
fire, (vii) defects
not discoverable by
due diligence, (viii)
omission by shipper,
(ix) for loading and
unloading activities,
unless carrier or
performing party
takes on activity on
behalf of shipper,
(x) wastage or
defects of goods,
(xi) insufficient or
defective packing
not performed on
behalf of carrier,
(xii) saving a life
or property at sea,
(xiii) attempts to
avoid environmental
damage, (xiv) when
goods removed that
may become danger,
pursuant to articles
15 and 163.

Based on Kindred & Brooks, Multimodal Rules, supranote 22 at 42, exhibit 3.2; the column
containing the Rotterdam Rules has been added to this exhibit and the rows reordered.

Table 3 examines the basis of liability on the multimodal operator for
damage and delay in the context of the three sets of multimodal rules,
as compared with the Rotterdam Rules. Based on the work of Kindred
and Brooks investigating the impact of the three sets of multimodal rules,
it becomes quite clear that there are four distinct areas that need to be
considered when a cargo owner looks at how these options might impact
his business' bases for competitiveness and profitability.4 5 First, Table 3
45.

Kindred & Brooks, Multimodal Rules, supra note 22.
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demonstrates that the basis of liability in multimodal moves is dependent
on the cargo owner's ability to attribute damage to the period of time that
the cargo is in the care of the carrier as specified in the contract of carriage.
Given the predominant focus of modem supply chains on time-based
competition, this is an improvement over earlier options. Second, this also
mandates that attribution to a particular leg of the journey is critical for
the cargo owner to be able to make a claim, particularly as the list of
excuses available to the carrier is now much broader (specifically Article
17.3). Third, and most important, the concept of delay has greater clarity;
a time frame is specified (which favours the cargo owner) and is balanced
with the limits on the time allowed to make a claim (of importance to the
carrier)-a better arrangement for both parties. Fourth and finally, Table
4 identifies that the Rotterdam Rules provide for higher limits by weight
and lower limits by value than the Multimodal Convention, but higher in
both cases than the UNCTAD/ICC Rules. While the weight limits are still
below those found in other modes, whether these new limits of liability are
seen as better for cargo interests is, of course a different matter and will
be evaluated by each cargo owner based on his or her claims history and
experience.
Table 4: Comparable Limits of Liability under Unimodal and
Multimodal Regimes in Ascending Order of Magnitude
Regime

Limit by Weight

Limit by Item

Sea Carriage
- Hague Rules (Arts. IV(5) and IX)

n/a
2.00 SDR/kg
2.50 SDR/kg

U.S. $500/pkg (= 338
SDR/pkg)
666.67 SDR/pkg
835 SDR/pkg

30 Poincare francs/kg

n/a

Hague/Visby Rules (Art. IV (5))
Hamburg Rules (Art. 6)
ICC Rules 1975 (Rule ll(c))

(-2 SDR/kg)

UNCTAD/ICC Rules 1992 (Rules 6.1 and 6.3)
- but if no sea leg

2.00 SDR/kg
8.33 SDR/kg

666.67 SDR/pkg

Multimodal Convention 1980 (Art. 18(1), (3).)
- but if no sea leg

2.75 SDR/kg
8.33 SDR/kg

920 SDR/pkg

Rotterdam Rules 2009 (Art. 59)

3 SDR/kg

875 SDR/pkg

Road Carriage-CMR (Art. 23)

8.33 SDR/kg

n/a

Rail Carriage-CIM Uniform Rules (Arts. 7,
40 and 42)

17.00 SDR/kg

n/a

Air Carriage-Warsaw Convention (Art. 22(2))

17.00 SDR/kg

n/a

Note:

Based on Kindred & Brooks, Mullimodal Rules, supra note 22 at 42, Exhibit 5.4; the row
containing the Rotterdam Rules has been added to Exhibit 5.4.
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Much of what is being written about the Rotterdam Rules appears to be
focused on the perceived imbalance between ship owner and cargo owner
liability, the contentiousness of volume contract provisions, the potential
for forum shopping if not widely adopted, and the complexity of the new
rules, with disadvantages for both ship owners and cargo owners; these are
well-detailed by Marine, Jones and Nader and worth additional reading. 46
III. A case ofdamage as illustration
As identified by Kindred and Brooks, the choice of rules by cargo interests
is dependent on the company's particular business requirements and
its claims history.47 Cargo owners will set their priorities by using risk
assessment techniques in order to determine which set of rules would
work best for their particular circumstances, assuming that they have some
measure of market power in dealing with the carrier. Kindred and Brooks
found that companies facing localized, simple physical loss or damage
without the complications of just-in-time shipments or delay in delivery
would have limited interest in the decision because the differences between
the rules for simple cargo damage that could be localized and attributed
were not particularly significant. On the other hand, the choice of rules
would most likely be of interest when cargo owners faced unattributable
losses or delay. However, in these cases, the Rotterdam Rules are not
applicable as the Rotterdam Rules only apply when the damage can be
attributed to the marine leg.
When damage may be attributed to the marine leg, the issues are clearer
but the limits of liability are not necessarily higher. According to Article
26 of the Rotterdam Rules, when a loss occurs during a carrier's period of
responsibility, but outside of the shipping process, the convention yields
to other international instruments, and the relevant unimodal convention
takes effect. However, in the case of attributable marine damage or delay,
the Rotterdam Rules set a lower ceiling of liability at 875 SDR per package
(compared to the 920 SDR per package for the Multimodal Convention),
or a higher ceiling of 3 SDR per kilogram (versus the Multimodal
Convention 1980's 2.75 SDR per kilogram), choosing whichever is higher
(Article 59.1).

46. Charles M Davis, "The Rotterdam Rules: Changes from COGSA" (2010), online: The Law
Office of Charles M Davis <http://davismarine.com>; and Peter Jones, "The UNCITRAL Convention
on Carriage of Goods by Sea: Harmonization or De-Harmonization?" (21 March 2010), online:
Forwarderlaw <http://www.forwarderlaw.com/library/view.php?articleid=602>; and Nader, supra
note 35.
47. Kindred & Brooks, Multimodal Rules, supra note 22.

284 The Dalhousie Law Journal

To explain the situation facing the cargo owner and so appreciate
the reality of likely outcomes, we have taken one of the cases (Case 2)
presented by Kindred and Brooks and updated it to consider the effects of
the Rotterdam Rules (Table 5).48 In this case, a shipment of twenty-eight
packages of machinery weighing 19,460 kg arrived minus two packages,
and the cargo owner, as identified by the contract of sale, laid claim for theft
against the marine carrier. The two missing packages each weighed 695
kg and so the limits of liability are calculated for both weight and package
at the rate of 1 SDR approximately equal to US$1.55, as of January 2012.
Table 5: Liabilityfor Partial Loss under the Marine Regimes
and the Multimodal Convention 1980
Regime

Rate

Hague Rules

U.S. $500/pkg
(= 338 SDR/

SDR Limit for
This Loss
--

US$ Limit for
This Loss
1,000.00

676.00

pkg)

Hague/Visby Rules

666.67 SDR/
pkg

Hamburg Rules 1978

1,333.34
2,780.00

2,066.68
4,309.00

835 SDR/pkg
2.50 SDR/kg

1,670.00
3,475.00

2,588.50
5,386.25

Multimodal Convention
1980

920 SDR/pkg
2.75 SDR/kg

1,840.00
3,822.50

2,852.00
5,924.10

Rotterdam Rules 2009

875 SDR/pkg
3 SDR/kg

1,750.00
4,170.00

2,712.50
6,463.50

2.00 SDR/kg

Note:

Based on Kindred & Brooks, Multimodal Rules, supra note 22 at 86, exhibit 5.5, but
calculated for the specific example of case 2; the two missing packages each weigh 695 kg
and so the limits of liability are calculated for both weight and package at the rate of I SDR
approximately equal to US$1.55 (as of January 2012). Liability is based on whichever is
higher and is, for this example, specifically calculated.

Article 59.2 of the Rotterdam Rules provides clarity in the definition
of a package, in that goods that are palletized or otherwise grouped are
deemed to be a single shipping unit. However, when the definition of a unit
is provided in the contract, the smallest unit indicated on the bill of lading
determines liability. As well, the Rotterdam Rules differ in the extent of
liability; under the Rotterdam Rules liability is limited to about US$1,360
(875 SDRs) per package or around US$4.65 (3 SDRs) per kilogram. As
seen in Table 5, for the loss of two packages each weighing 695 kilograms,
the cargo owner stands to gain about US$6,460 in total from the kilogram
coverage (as opposed to the lower amounts under other rules or by

48.

Ibid.
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claiming the package amount). This needs further context, however; most
manufactured goods have a significantly higher value per kilogram, and
that value has grown more rapidly than the growth in the absolute limit,
and so the cargo owner will still need to purchase additional insurance
coverage.
According to Pallares, the major aspect of the Rotterdam Rules that
will be a deciding factor for their widespread adoption will be related to
the issue of liability.4 9 Article 59 allows for higher limits on liability than
the Hamburg Rules at 875 SDR per package or 3 SDR per kilogram but
volume contracts can encourage the parties to work around the higher
limits. In fiercely competitive markets, this may provide carriers or cargo
owners with sufficient incentive to alter coverage, playing loose with the
rules on volume contracts, and this will ultimately work against widespread
adoption.
IV. Other issues for users of liner shipping: Volume contracts and
e-documentation
The position of the Canadian International Freight Forwarders Association
(CIFFA) on the Rotterdam Rules provides a good summary of the key
issues seen by many parties; that is, concerns about changes to the basis
and extent of liabilities and to the reality of volume contracts in modern
carriage. It is CIFFA's opinion that the convention should not be signed
for these reasons. Under the Rotterdam Rules, potential liabilities are
significantly increased and the time frame when a carrier would be held
liable for goods lengthened. Previously, carriers were only liable for goods
while in transit on the sea, but would now be responsible from the point
of receiving goods to the point of delivery. Furthermore, CIFFA finds
particular concern in the wording around liabilities arising from delays.
From the Hamburg to the Rotterdam Rules, the wording has changed from
a carrier being responsible for losses caused by a delay to simply being
liable for delays in delivery if not included in the specified exemptions.
That point underscores a critical flaw in the Rules; Tetley correctly notes
that the large number of exemptions and exclusions in the convention
deviate from the original purpose of obtaining uniformity in the legal
regime and thereby provides grounds for non-adoption."
Furthermore, volume contracts allow for carriers and shippers to
deviate from the terms of the convention, allowing for freedom of contract.
Through volume contract provisions, a carrier and shipper can come to an
49. Lorena Sales Pallares, "A Brief Approach to the Rotterdam Rules: Between Hope and
Disappointment" (2011) 42:3 J Mar L & Comm 453.
50. Tetley, supra note 29.
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alternative agreement on liability. This means that the Rotterdam Rules
may not govern many contractual agreements at all. In such cases, smaller
shippers may have insufficient market power and will be forced to accept
unfair terms that deviate from the Rotterdam Rules. CIFFA believes
that, in practice, this will lead to premium pricing for transport under full
liability Rotterdam Rules, and lower freight rates for reduced liability
under volume contracts.' When a number of parties and contracts are
involved, the claims will ultimately go back to the shipper and defeat the
purpose of the volume contracts.
Like CIFFA, the International Federation of Freight Forwarders
Associations (FIATA) opposes the Rotterdam Rules, citing their
complexity, an imbalance of responsibility and liability, and the increased
burden placed by Article 82, which gives precedence to other conventions
that deal with different transportation methods, in finding the point where
damages or loss occurred.52
The European Shippers Council (ESC) also opposes the Rotterdam
Rules, taking issue with the increased liability exposure, the legal
complexity and ambiguity in provisions that could cause an increase in
litigation, and problems with the interaction of the new rules with existing
rules for unimodal transportation."
In the U.S., on the other hand, the National Industrial Transportation
League (NITL) disagrees with ESC criticisms, seeing the new rules as
being consistent with modem realities of shipping and useful in bringing
together the currently fragmented legal regimes for liability. NITL asserts
that there will be no conflict with existing conventions because the
Rotterdam Rules will override existing conventions and there is equality
in liabilities between shippers and carriers, as both parties must agree upon
any changes in liability. Furthermore, NITL dismisses ESC criticisms of
volume contract provisions; rather than concluding that carriers will take
advantage of smaller shippers, NITL concludes that volume contracts that

51. Tony Young, "CIFFA Submission to Transport Canada Commentary on the Rotterdam
Rules" (21 March 2009), online: CIFFA <http://www.ciffa.com/downloads/2009/03/30/CIFFA%20
Submission%20to%2OTransport%20Canada%20on%20the%20Rotterdam%2ORules%20March%20
2009.pdf>.
52. FIATA, "Position on the UN Convention on Contracts for the International Carriage of Foods
wholly or partly by sea (the 'Rotterdam Rules')" (2009), online: UNCITRAL <http://www.uncitral.
org/pdf/english/texts/transport/rotterdamrules/FIATApaper.pdf>
53. RG Edmonson, "European Shippers Adamant Against Rotterdam Rules," The Journal of
Commerce (30 June 2009), online: JOC <http://www.joc.com/maritime-news/european-shippersadamant-against-rotterdam-rules_20090630.htm>.

Will the Rotterdam Rules be Accepted?
A Liner Cargo Interest Perspective

287

deviate from the convention must be explicitly stated and agreed upon by
both parties, and thus any changes will be transparent and negotiated.5 4
The ability of the Rotterdam Rules to facilitate electronic transactions
has also been a subject of considerable debate. In the last decade, the
increasing use of e-commerce by companies large and small, coupled with
increasing need for electronic filing for security purposes (like the U.S.
advanced notification rules embodied in the U.S. Maritime Transportation
Security Act of 2002" and their extra-territorial reach) have added another
layer to the challenges facing users of maritime contracts of carriage.
Articles 38 and 41 in Chapter 8 of the Rotterdam Rules contain provisions
dealing with electronic bills of lading. On the one hand, Edmonson notes
that the convention recognizes the legality of electronic transactions, and
thus cargo booking along with the issuance of letters of credit and bills of
lading may be executed completely electronically.5 6 On the other hand,
Chan sees the following issues as remaining outstanding":
*
*
*
*
*

determining what is considered an electronic signature;
how to know whether the electronic record contains the electronic
signature of the carrier;
how the electronic signature can identify the signatory to the
electronic record;
how the electronic signature can indicate carrier authorization of
the electronic record; and
the extent to which the electronic record is considered evidence of
the carrier's receipt of goods.

In his examination of the positions of the U.S., EU, and Hong Kong
on the subject, Chan reports that the U.S. accepts e-signatures under the
2000 Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act," but
requires no minimum level of security, allowing parties to determine the
level of technology required.5 9 The EU similarly recognizes e-signatures,
but also provides for the presumption of validity for specific technologies

54. NITL, "Response to the National Industrial Transportation League to the European Shippers'
Council Position Paper on the Rotterdam Rules" (2009), online: UNCITRAL <http://www.uncitral.
org/pdf/english/texts/transport/rotterdam rules/NITLResponsePaper.pdf>.
55. Maritime TransportationSecurity Act of 2002, Pub L No 107-295, 116 Stat 2064.
56. RG Edmonson, "Rotterdam Rules Could Ease Electronic Transactions," The Journal of
Commerce (14 April 2010), online: JOC <http://www.joc.com/regulation-policy/rotterdam-rulescould-ease-electronic-transactions 20100414.html>.
57. Chan, supranote 38.
58. Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, Pub L No 106-229, 114 Stat 464
(2000).
59. Chan, supranote 38.
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set out in the EU Electronic SignatureDirective.60 Hong Kong goes even
further and will only recognize validity from recognized certification
authorities under the 2004 Electronic Transaction Ordinance,' though
parties can also agree to use methods supplied by another reliable and
appropriate source. Chan concludes that the ability of the Rotterdam Rules
to support completely electronic transactions has yet to be tested.
The World Customs Organization (WCO) also has an interest in the
development of electronic documentation options in international carriage
for the purposes of border security and control. The WCO's SAFE
Framework of Standards puts forward standards for security in global
trade. One of the core elements of the WCO standards is harmonization of
electronic cargo information, which is accomplished through the WCO data
model. This model is used to provide consistency in electronic exchanges
and facilitate the exchange of information between businesses and customs,
and to assist different customs bodies to identify high-risk cargo. 62 This
framework fits in with the concept of a "Single Window" for the purposes
of transportation regulatory requirements. From the viewpoint of the
WCO, this concept envisions information being delivered through a single
portal and information being disseminated to other bodies through this
environment. Though this framework is not necessarily for the purposes
for electronic data, it is useful in the application of electronic data-driven
communications. 6 The provisions set out in Article 9 and Article 10 of the
Rotterdam Rules for the use of electronic documents are largely consistent
with the WCO Standards and the Single Window concept, as well as other
frameworks on the exchange of electronic documents. 64
The final, and perhaps most important, issue from a cargo perspective
is the role of volume contracts in the carrier-cargo relationship. The role
of volume contracting in a number of liner trades was well developed
by the late 1990s. In the U.S., service contracts have been in place since
the Shipping Act of 198465; however, rates were made publicly available,
60. EC, Directive 1999/93/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 1999
on a Community Framework For electronicsignatures, [2000] OJ, L 13/12 [EU Electronic Signature
Directive].
61. Electronic Transaction Ordinance,(2004) Cap 553 (HK).
62. World Customs Organization, "WCO SAFE Framework of Standards" (June 2011), online: APL
<http://www.apl.com/security/documents/safeframework.pdf>.
63. World Customs Organization, "The Single Window Concept: The World Customs Organization's
Perspective," online: World Customs Organization <http://www.wcoomd.org/en/topics/Facilitation/
activities-and-programmes//-/media/FA35ECDE953D4CDDA32A58D6F620B IFE.ashx>.
64. James Giermanski, "What the Rotterdam Rules Should Do for Global Supply Chain Security,"
The Maritime Executive (31 March 2011), online: Maritime Executive <http://www.maritimeexecutive.com/article/what-the-rotterdam-rules-should-do-for-global-stpply-chain-security>.
65. Shipping Act of 1984, Pub L No 98-237, 98 Stat 67.
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which limited the use of such contracts.66 With the passage of the Ocean
Shipping Reform Act of 1998,67 confidential service contracts became
legal in U.S. liner trades.6 1 Such contracts were already accepted by
the European Union and by Canada. In the last decade, the volume of
containerized trade using confidential service contracts has mushroomed,
and such contracts are now the norm rather than the exception. According
to Mukherjee and Bal, almost all U.S. shippers elect to use confidential
service contracts and such agreements currently make up more than 95%
of U.S. liner trade.6 9 The Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) provides
data on service contracts filed with them on a monthly basis through their
SERVCON database. The data are both for filed service contracts between
a shipper and carrier as well as between a shipper and non-vessel operating
common carrier (NVOCC). The latter are referred to as NVOCC service
arrangements (NSA) and have been in place since 2002.70 The data show a
steady increase in service contracts being filed with the FMC on an annual
basis." In fact, in March 2012 alone, 4,039 original service contracts and
42,624 amendments were filed by shipping lines! This did not include the
65 original service contracts and 135 NSAs filed that month, and March
2012 was not an unusual month; April 2011 had twice as many original
filings. Clearly, the data support the Mukherjee and Bal assertion that
service contracts have become the standard for transport arrangements
in the manufactured goods trades. It has been more than 25 years since
the U.S. Shipping Act of 198472 promoted the use of independent action
by liner shipping companies and more than 10 years since their Ocean
Shipping Reform Act of 1998 7 promoted confidential service contracts;
given the use of similar agreements in the U.S., Europe and Canada,
the development of volume contract provisions in the Rotterdam Rules
should be seen as inevitable and necessary. However, as noted by Tetley,
accompanying that flexibility to contract with more legal options than
before adds to the probability of non-adoption of the Rotterdam Rules and
66. Proshanto K Mukherjee & Abhinayan Basu Bal, "A legal and economic analysis of the volume
contract concept under the Rotterdam Rules: Selected issues in perspective" (2010) 77:1 Journal of
Transportation Law, Logistics and Policy 27.
67. Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 1998, Pub L No 105-258, 112 Stat 1908.
68. Mary R Brooks, Sea Changein Liner Shipping: Regulation and ManagerialDecision-Making in
a Global Industry (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 2000).
69. Mukherjee & Bal, supra note 66.
70. Federal Maritime Commission Service Contract Filing System (SERVCON), "Statistics,"
online: FM SERVCON <https://servcon.fmc.gov/stat/>.
71. Federal Maritime Commission, "Questions," online: Federal Maritime Commission <http://
www.fmc.gov/questions/default.aspx#378>.
72. ShippingAct of 1984, Pub L 98-237, 98 Stat 67.
73. Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 1998, Pub L 105-258, 112 Stat 1908.
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greater likelihood of forum shopping and confusion for less astute buyers
of transport services.74
The use ofelectronic seals and documentation from origin to destination
in combination with advanced notification rules, which have focused on
both identifying the true cargo owner and ensuring the manifest is clean of
ambiguity for inspection targeting purposes, have reinforced the need for
modernization of the rules to modem container shipping. However, that
advance has been potentially offset by the adoption of volume contract
provisions. Although many see these provisions as allowing for a fair and
equitable distribution of liability being negotiated between parties, there
are other voices that are concerned that this equity will not be seen due to a
potential imbalance of power between larger carriers and smaller shippers.
That said, volume contracts are a natural extension of existing service
contract systems that have seen widespread use since being adopted.
Conclusions
When the Hague Rules were agreed in 1924, the port-to-port nature
of shipping presented the legal community with the opportunity to get
the rules of engagement right for marine transport contracts. However,
at the time there was no way that carriers, beneficial cargo owners or
governments could be expected to anticipate the modern trading realities
of globalization, multimodal transport, cargo and ship security regimes,
and e-commerce. Since the development of the Hague Rules, there have
been several attempts to revisit the rules and bring contracts of carriage
into alignment with commercial practices and expectations. The advent of
containerization, the increasing complexity of modem supply chains, the
development of electronic documentation and the enhanced importance
of security have made carrier-shipper relations incredibly complex while
at the same time driving governments more and more towards a desire
to harmonize the way in which global financial and trading rules are
implemented.
Today, this complexity sees transport for all but bulk commodities
as predominantly door-to-door negotiated contracts involving multiple
players with non-transparent, non-disclosed supply chain relationships
and diverse carriage contractual arrangements between the parties. Instead
of the simple interested or disinterested cargo owner presented by Kindred
and Brooks in 1997, the modem trading environment has many players
making choices based on negotiated global supply contracts not anticipated
in the early 1990s. Today's liner shipping companies most frequently

74.
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conduct their work under global volume contracts, amended frequently
to reflect the volatility of the post-global economic crisis period, and with
an array of alliances and sub-deals that were never considered, or in fact
were not possible, without electronic data transfer, Internet-enhanced coordination and global banking arrangements. Where the Rotterdam Rules
run into difficulty and become less credible to cargo owners of influence
is when volume contracts (now the de facto standard) choose to exclude
the carriage from the application of the rules. What this implies is that
introduction of the new rules, rather than providing clarity to all in the
relationship, has created an additional possible combination of issues,
thus increasing the level of complexity even further. There does not
exist consensus between trading partners on applicable rules, nor is there
consensus between carrier and cargo owner. Furthermore, the definition of
a carrier has changed so that the Rotterdam Rules see freight forwarders as
fulfilling the carrier role when the cargo owner often assumes forwarders
are agents of the cargo owner. In summary, it seems that the now ever
more confused cargo owner must rely on her marine insurance agent to
cover as many risks as possible, recognizing that the carriage contract
offered by the carrier will never be written in favour of the cargo owner.
The transport world has come so far in reducing transport costs that they
become negligible in influencing the consumer's choice of product at the
store; as a result, another set of rules has created work for the maritime
legal industry and confusion for insurers and cargo owners who will have
to wait to see how the courts interpret the new language.
As Kindred and Brooks noted, when unattributed loss or damage
occurs, the UNCTAD/ICC Rules grant no more compensation than
is possible under the ICC Rules 1975.71 However, the ICC Rules 1975
are completely unacceptable in a modem trading environment, where
reliability is a major factor in the choice of carrier; as more and more
supply chains have adopted just-in-time practices and level-of-service
agreements are becoming the norm in transport contracting, delay as one
element of reliability has become the focal point for cargo interests. The
1975 rules are, to quote Kindred and Brooks, "so complex that they are
almost unworkable. ...Particularly galling to the cargo owner must be the
provision in rule 11 of the ICC Rules 1975 that provides for compensation
for delay only in instances when the delay can be attributed to a particular
stage and carrier. This provision is clearly out of touch with the seamless
nature of multimodal transport."7 As the Rotterdam Rules only apply
75.
76.

Kindred & Brooks, Multimodal Rules, supra note 22.
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in cases where damage is attributable to the marine carrier, they are still
not attractive from a cargo perspective even though they have been more
explicit in defining delay and have raised the limits of liability.
In summary, it appears that the Rotterdam Rules face similar prospects
to the Hamburg Rules-for unimodal container moves port-to-port, they
bring just another permutation to the table. For nultimodal transport, there
remains considerable confusion as to what will work best in the door-todoor context and a trading environment focused on time-based competition
where the consequences of cargo delay are a paramount consideration for
a large portion of the moves. For all the legislative and political work
over the last decade, it seems that trading interests are still inadequately
served by the trading rules available. As noted by Kindred and Brooks,
"given that shippers tend to defer to the rules imprinted by the multimodal
operator on the back of its contractual documents, the shipper may have
little choice in their use."" As most liner shipping has converted to volume
contracts, at least the terms on the back of the contract are now subject to
negotiation for those cargo owners with market power. For other cargo
owners, the future is now even more uncertain.
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Appendix 1: Signatoriesto the Rotterdam Rules
Nation

Date of Signature (Date of Ratification)

Armenia

29/09/2009

Cameroon

29/09/2009

Congo

23/09/2009

DR Congo

23/09/2010

Denmark

23/09/2009

France

23/09/2009

Gabon

23/09/2009

Ghana

23/09/2009

Greece

23/09/2009

Guinea

23/09/2009

Luxembourg

31/08/2010

Madagascar

25/09/2009

Mali

26/10/2009

Netherlands

23/09/2009

Niger

22/10/2009

Nigeria

23/09/2009

Norway

23/09/2009

Poland

23/09/2009

Senegal

23/09/2009

Spain

23/09/2009 (19/01/2011)

Sweden

20/07/2011

Switzerland

23/09/2009

Togo

23/09/2009

USA

23/09/2009

Source: United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, "Status. 2008 United
Nations Convention on Contracts For the International Carriage of Goods
Wholly or Partly by Sea-the 'Rotterdam Rules,"' online: UNCITRAL
<http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral-texts/transport goods
/rotterdamstatus.html> (last accessed 11April 2012).
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Appendix 2: Signatory/RatificationStatus
Multimodal Transport Convention 1980
Nation

Signature

Burundi

Ratification (Accession, a)
4 Sep 1998 a

Chile

9 Jul 1981

7 Apr 1982

Georgia

21 Mar 1996 a

Lebanon

1 Jun 2001 a

Liberia

16 Sep 2005 a

Malawi

2 Feb 1984 a

Mexico

10 Oct 1980

11 Feb 1982

Morocco

25 Nov 1980

21 Jan 1993

Norway

28 Aug 1981

Rwanda

2 Jul 198

Venezuela (Bolivarian
Republic

Zambia

15 Sep 1987 a

_

Senegal

25 Oct 1984

31 Aug 1981

of)

7 Oct 1991 a

Source: United Nations, "Status. United Nations Convention on International Multimodal Transport
of Goods," online: United Nations Treaty Collection <http://treaties.un.org/pages/
ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsgno-XI-E- I&chapter-l I &lang-en>

